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TITLE VII-RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION-
MORE THAN DE MINIMUS COST IN
ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYEE'S RELIGIOUS
NEEDS IS AN UNDUE HARDSHIP
TO EMPLOYER.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977).
INTRODUCTION
Hardison was hired by Trans World Airlines (TWA) in June 1967
as clerk in the Stores Department in Kansas City. Like all other
employees at the Kansas City facility, Hardison was subject to a
seniority system contained in a collective bargaining agreement bet-
ween TWA and the International Association of Machinists (IAM).
The senior workers have first preference for job and shift
assignments. In 1968 Hardison joined the World Wide Church of
God. The Sabbath for that religion is observed from sundown Friday
to sundown Saturday. Hardison informed the manager of the Stores
Department of his religious convictions and was allowed to work the
11 -to-7 night shift, which did not require Friday night work.
Hardison bid for and received a transfer to another department and a
day shift. This department operated twenty-four hours per day, seven
days a week. Since Hardison was on the bottom of the seniority list,
he was asked to work Saturdays.
TWA agreed to permit the union to allow Hardison a change of
work assignments to his advantage, but the union was not willing to
violate the seniority provisions of the collective-bargaining contract.
TWA rejected Hardison's proposal of working a four-day week.
Hardison failed to report to work on three consecutive Saturdays and
was discharged on grounds of insubordination for refusing to work
during his scheduled shift.
After exercising all administrative procedures, Hardison brought
actionI under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 charging
TWA and IAM with religious discrimination. The federal district
court held in favor of the company and the union. The court said that
requiring TWA to accommodate Hardison's religious practice would
not constitute an establishment of religion and that TWA had met its
"reasonable accommodation" obligations. The court said Title VII
was applicable to the union, but that the union was not required to
violate its seniority system. On appealI the Eight Circuit reversed,
'Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F.Supp. 877 (W.D.Mo. 1974).
'42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1970).
'Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
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holding that TWA had practiced religious discrimination and had not
made sufficient efforts to accommodate.
On petition for certiorari,4 the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit and held that: (1) the seniority system itself was significant ac-
commodation to the religious and secular needs of TWA's
employees; S (2) an agreed upon seniority system is not required to ac-
commodate religious observances;6 (3) under 703(h) of Title VII, ab-
sent a discriminatory purpose, a seniority system cannot be an
unlawful employment practice even if the system is discriminatory in
effect,7 and (5) to require TWA to bear more than a de minimus cost
in order to give Hardison Saturdays off would be an undue hardship.
There are three issues presented in this case: (1) what is meant by
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship; (2) what is the effect
of Title VII on unions, particularly where seniority systems are in-
volved; and (3) does the reasonable accommodation duty violate the
establishment clause?
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, was enacted by
Congress in 1964. The purpose of the act was to prohibit discrimina-
tion against an individual because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.' The primary interest of Congress by enacting Title VII
was to remedy the past history of racial discrimination in employ-
ment.' ° Nevertheless, the Title VII drafters added "religion" among
the listed prohibitions, seemingly without providing serious thought to
the consequences that would occur."I
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
promulgates regulations under the statute, 2 issued initial guidelines in
'Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
'Id. at 78.
'Id. at 79, 80.
'Id. at 82.
'Id. at 84.
'42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2 (1970).
"°H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The House Committee on the
Judiciary stated that Title VII was incorporated in H.R. 7152 to "commit our Nation to
the elimination of many of the worst manifestations of racial prejudice." Id. at 2.
"Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination And The Role OfArbitration Under
Title VII, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 599,600 (1971); Gordon, Up Against The Accommodation
Rule, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 56 (1976).
2142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1970). However, the effect and weight to be given to these
regulatory guidelines has itself been a controversial issue. See Reid v. Memphis
Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 1975) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433, 434 (1971).
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1966.3 The applicable sections were amended in 1967." The 1967
guidelines placed an affirmative duty on the employer "to make
reasonable accommodations to the religious needes of employees...
where such accommodation can be made without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business.""
In January 1972 the Act was amended'" by Congress in S.B.
2515 '7 to require the substance of the EEOC guidelines to be incor-
porated into Title VII. The amendment reads:
(j) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospec-
tive employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
The uncertainty of the meaning of "unreasonable accommodation"
and "undue hardship" I" has resulted in conflicting judicial interpreta-
1"31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
"EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1
(1976), effective July 13, 1967. § 1605.1.
(a) Observation of the Sabbath and other religious holidays. Several com-
plaints filed with the Commission have raised the question whether it is
discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire
employees who regularly observe Friday evening and Saturday, or some
other day of the week, as the Sabbath or who observe certain special
religious holidays during the year and, as a consequence, do not work on
such days.
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds required by § 701(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, includes
an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommoda-
tions to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where
such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example,
may exist where the employee's needed work cannot be performed by
another employee of substantially similar qualifications during the period
of absence of the Sabbath observer.(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to
hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the
employer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the
required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee
reasonable.(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort
to seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situa-
tions which arise due to the varied religious practices of the American
people.
"29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1976).
"Pub.L. 92-261:86 Stat. 103 (1972).
"Senator Randolph of West Virginia, a Seventh-Day Baptist, sponsored this bill
with the intentions to erase the law announced by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey v.
Reynolds, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 402
U.S. 689(1971). See 118 Cong. Rec. 705 (1972).
"142 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) as amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
"Gordon, Up Against The Accommodation Rule, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 56, 57, 58,
62 (1972).
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tion by the various circuits.20 It seems that an accommodation is
reasonable when there is no undue hardship on the employer. So, the
real problem exists in the interpretation of the meaning of "undue
hardship." "2
One meaning suggested by case law is that "undue hardship" is
not just hardship, but something "greater than hardship." 22 Another
court has held that to deny the rights of some in order to accom-
modate the religious needs of others is an undue hardship.2 Johnson
v. U.S. Postal Service" held that anything more than a good-faith
effort to accommodate an employee's religious observances and prac-
tices would be an undue hardship on the employer.
The inconsistency regarding "undue hardship" and "accommoda-
tion" is illustrated in three Sixth Circuit decisions2S decided within an
eight-month period. The first decision was Cummins v. Parker Seal
Company. Cummins, an employee for Parker Seal Company, was
promoted to supervisor after eight years of service. Subsequently,
Cummins became a member of the World Wide Church of God and
refused to work Saturdays. When fellow supervisors complained
about substituting for Cummins on Saturdays, he was discharged.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's sustaining of his
discharge, stating:
The objections and complaints of fellow employees, in and of
themselves, do not constitute undue hardship in the conduct of an
employer's business. If employees are disgruntled because an
employer accommodates its work rules to the religious needs of one
employee, under EEOC Regulation 1605 and Section 2000e(j) such
grumbling must yield to the single employee's right to practice his
religion. 2'
Three months after the Cummins decision, the Sixth Circuit con-
fronted the same issue in Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co." but this
10Hardison v. T.W.A., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Draper v. United States Pipe &
Foundry, 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,516 F.2d 544 (6th
Cir. 1975). Also note the intra-conflicting decisions of the Sixth Circuit in Reid v.
Memphis Publishing Co. (I), 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972) and Reid v. Memphis
Publishing Co. (11), 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975). See Gordon, Up Against The Accom-
modation Rule, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 56, 58 (1976).
"Gordon, Up Against The Accommodation Rule, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 56, 62
(1976).
"Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 551 (6th Cir. 1975) aff'd mem. by an
equally divided Court 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
"Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F. 2d 512, 521 (6th Cir. 1975).
14497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974).
"Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975) aff'd mem. by an equal-
ly divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527
F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1976); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975).
"Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975).
27521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975).
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time reached an opposite conclusion. The court stated that forced
substitution and lowered morale among employees created an undue
hardship on employers. Reid, a Seventh-Day Adventist, applied for a
copyreader job with Memphis Publishing Company. To hire Reid,
the Company would have to assign an unwilling copyreader to take
Reid's place on Saturdays. The Company believed this would create a
serious morale problem among the other nine copyreaders who would
have seniority over Reid.2" On a second appeal," the court reversed
and held that the company had established it burden 30 of proving un-
due hardship.
Just four months after Reid, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the
rationale of Cummins. In Draper v. United States Pipe and Foundry
Company, 3' the Sixth Circuit held 704(j) "that the grumbling of
employees because an employer accommodates its work rules to the
religious needs of a single employee is not a chaotic personnel problem
or an undue hardship on the employer." 2
The Supreme Court in Hardison acknowledged in its first point
that the intent and effect of Section 704(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j) was to make an unlawful employment practice under section
703(a)(1) for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations,
short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of his employees
and prospective employees." Although the statutory obligation of an
employer to reasonably accommodate his employee was clear, the
Court felt that the degree or extent of accommodation required by an
employer was never specifically outlined by Congress or by the EEOC
guidelines.3 '
In defining the limits of an employer's obligation to accom-
modate, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' suggested
alternatives 5 and found that TWA had made reasonable efforts to ac-
"Id. at 516.
"Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975).
Reid first brought suit against Memphis Publishing Company in 1971. The case was
appealed to Sixth Circuit on issues of both racial and religious discrimination. The
Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the Memphis
Publishing Company could make a reasonable accommodation to the religious practices
of Reid without undue hardship (468 F.2d 346). The case was appealed again to the
Sixth Circuit in 1975.
"To determine what constitutes an employer's burden, see 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c)
(1976).
" 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1976).
"Id. at 520, 521.
"Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
"Id. at 79.
"The alternatives suggested by the Court of Appeals were: (1) TWA could have per-
mitted Hardison to work a four-day week, utilizing in his place a supervisor or another
worker on duty elsewhere; (2) TWA could have filled Hardison's Saturday shift from
other available personnel; (3) TWA could have arranged a swap between Hardison and
1978]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
commodate." TWA established that it held several meetings with
Hardison and attempted to find a solution. TWA did accommodate
Hardison's observance of his special religious holidays. TWA
authorized the union steward to search for someone who would swap
shifts; but the union was not willing to violate the seniority provisions
set out in the contract to make a shift change,' and TWA felt that it
should not take steps inconsistent with a collective bargaining agree-
ment or seniority provision."
The Court concluded: (1) "to require TWA to bear more than a de
minimus cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue
hardship," 39 and (2) "in the absence of clear statutory language or
legislative history to the contrary, we will not readily construe Title
VII to require an employer to discriminate against some employees in
order to enable others to observe their Sabbath."'
0
Justice Marshall in the dissenting opinion joined by Justice Bren-
nan construed the majority opinion as a fatal blow to all efforts under
Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious practices."
Justice Marshall also expressed discontent because the majority totally
disregarded the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to Title
VII. Marshall said the Court concluded in essence that an employer
need not grant even minor special privileges to religious observers to
enable them to follow their faith.'
2
UNION SENIORITY SYSTEMS
Another issue addressed in Hardison is what accommodation, if
any, must a union make to an employee when a collective bargaining
agreement which typically allocates work by uniformly applying rules
based upon seniority is involved." The senior worker is usually allow-
ed preference over other employees for promotion, shifts, layoffs, and
other such advantages." The provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)
another employee either for another shift or for the Sabbath days. 527 F.2d 33, 39, 40,
41 (8th Cir. 1975).
"Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77 (1977).
"Id. at 78,79.
"Id. at 79.
"Id. at 84.
0Id. at 85.
"Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 86 (1977), (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
"Id. at 88. See also R. Nixon (Religious Liberty Counsel for General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventist), Sabbath Work Problems 4 (June 24, 1977).
4"432 U.S. 63, 78-81 (1977)..See Gordon, UpAgainst The Accommodation Rule, 45
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 56, 64-70 (1976).
"Gordon, Up Against The Accommodation Rule, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 56,64
(1976).
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seem to indicate that an accommodation by the union is required. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) provides:
It is an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization to
discriminate against any individual because of his religion or to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual
in violation of this section.
However, a specific provision of the Act which indicates that Con-
gress intended unions to be bound by different standards is the "bona
fide seniority provision" "which provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system ... provided that such differences are not the result of an inten-
tion to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
In Cooper v. General Dynamics,'6 the Fifth Circuit determined
that unions, as well as employers, must reasonably accommodate the
religious beliefs of employees provided there is no undue hardship.
The appellants in Cooper were members of the Seventh-Day Adventist
Church. Each appellant had over ten years service with General
Dynamics. None of the appellants were members of the union. In
1972, for the first time, General Dynamics and the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIOincor-
porated a union security provision in their collective bargaining agree-
ment, one of the "agency shop" variety."'
When appellants realized that they would have to pay dues'" to
maintain their employment, they filed suit in district court where the
employer and union prevailed. On appeal' 9 the Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding that a reasonable accommodation would include per-
"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h) (1970). The Supreme Court stated that the unmistakable
purpose of this section was to make clear that the routine application of a bona fide
seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII. The Court also held that ab-
sent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an
unlawful employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory conse-
quences. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 741, 758 (1976).
"533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976).
"Under this provision, union membership was not a condition of continued
employment, but payment to the union of a sum equal to its current dues was a condi-
tion.
"'The religious belief of Seventh-Day Adventists is that any support of a labor
union, including payment of dues under agency shop provisions, is a godless act incon-
sistent with the commandment to love one's neighbor. To support a union would be to
place one's soul in jeopardy. Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir.
1976).
"Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (1976).
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mitting a continuation of regular work assignments while not paying
union dues."0
The opposite view is that a union should not be held to the same
reasonable accommodation standard as an employer. This view was
convincingly argued in several legal comments.II The Civil Rights Act
itself provides evidence throughout its provisions that Congress did
not intend for unions to be bound by the duty to accommodate,"
since the decision-making power necessary for accommodation is
vested in the employer only, and not in the power of the union." So
long as the collective bargaining agreement is non-discriminatory, the
union's duty is limited to a fair enforcement of the contract on behalf
of all its members."1
Although significant judicial interpretations of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) were provided in racial discrimination cases," prior to
Hardison," this section had not been argued persuasively in any
religious discrimination suits. Considering the application of this sec-
tion the Court felt that it could not require an agreed-upon seniority
system to yield to accommodate religious observances.' The opinion
of the Court was that the seniority system itself represented a signifi-
cant accommodation to the needs, both religious and secular, of all
TWA employees.5 '
'OId. at 163, 164, 169, 170.
"Bernstein, Employer's Duty To Reasonably Accommodate, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV.
795, 813-816 (1976); Gordon, Up Against The Accommodation Rule, 45 U.M.K.C. 56,
64-70 (1976). These comments argued that the relationship between the accommoda-
tion rule and the bona ide seniority exception should not create a preference for in-
dividual religious practice which supersedes a bona fide collective bargaining agree-
ment. To allow such a discriminatory preference would be contrary to the very thing
that the Supreme Court had forbidden in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
"The Act distinguishes between employers and labor organizations. The EEOC
regulation clearly places the obligation to accommodate on the part of the employer
where such accomodation can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (b) (1976).
"Gordon, Up Against The Accommodation Rule, 45 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 56, 66
(1976).
"Id.
"Franks v. Bowman Transportation, Inc., 424 U. S. 747 (1976); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The crux of these decisions was that a seniority system
is bona ide if (1) there is no intent to discriminate, (2) the system does not have the ef-
fect of perpetuating past discrimination, and (3) if the system does have a
discriminatory effect it can be justified by a business necessity.
"Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
"Id. at 79. The Court seemed to ignore 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) which makes it an
unlawful employment practice for a labor orgainzation to discriminate against any in-
dividual because of his religion. It also appears that the obligation placed on the union
in Copper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976) was discarded.
"Id. at 78.
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The Court continued:
Had TWA nevertheless circumvented the seniority system by relieving
Hardison of Saturday work and ordering a senior employee to replace
him, it would have denied the latter his shift preference so that Har-
dison could be given his. The senior employee would have been
deprived of his contractual rights under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment."
The Court concluded that Title VII does not require an employer to go
that far. In support of this conclusion, the Court cited 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h), reiterating the fact that a bona fide seniority system was
not unlawful under Title VII. 60
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The constitutional validity of the accommodation rule has been
raised repeatedly in religious discrimination cases.6 In Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Company," the Sixth Circuit doubted the validity of
the "accommodation rule" because it appeared to violate the
Establishment Clause of the first amendment. Most courts, however,
have rejected this view. 6
In Cummins the Sixth Circuit extensively discussed the argument
that the "reasonable accommodation rule" was an establishment of
religion. 64 The court rejected this argument, relying upon the tripar-
"Id. at 80.
"Id. at 81, 82.
" Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1975) aff'd mem. by an equal-
ly divided Court 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Cooper v. General Dynamics, 553 F.2d 164 (5th
Cir. 1976); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1970) aff'd mem. by
an equally divided Court 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
"429 F.2d 326, 334, 335 (6th Cir. 1970). Sixth Circuit Judge Weick said "to con-
strue the Act as authorizing the adoption of Regulations which would coerce or compel
an employer to accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of all his employees
would raise grave constitutional questions of violation of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. It is settled that the Government, in its relations with religious
believers and nonblievers, must be neutral. The Government is without power to sup-
port, assist, favor or handicap any religion."
"See Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975);
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by an equally
divided Court 97 S.Ct. 342 (1976); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346 (6th
Cir. 1972).
"Cummins v. Parker ;eal Co., 516 F.2d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 1975). Parker Seal Com-
pany argued that the reasonable accommodation rule could require an employer to ex-
cuse an employee from Saturday work in order to attend church while an atheistic
employee who wanted Saturday for leisure activities would have no similar rights under
the Civil Rights Act. Thus, the accommodation rule was alleged to constitute a
government-mandated preference for religion impermissible under the First Amend-
ment.
1978]
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tite "establishment" test set forth in Committee for Public Education
v. Nyquist: 6
(1) Purpose Standard - The statute must reflect a clearly secular
legislative purpose; (2) Effect Standard - The statute must have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; (3) En-
tanglement Standard - The statute must avoid excessive government
entanglement with religion.
The purpose standard was satisfied regarding "the reasonable ac-
commodation rule" because, like Title VII as a whole, the Act's
primary purpose was to prevent discrimination in employment and to
assure that employees are judged solely on merit, not on
nonemployment-related criteria." The effect standard was also
satisfied because the primary effect of the rule was to inhibit
discrimination, not to advance religion .6  Finally, the entanglement
standard was complied with because the government was not entan-
gled with the issues; only the EEOC and the courts can resolve
whether the employer has made a reasonable accommodation and
whether an undue burden has resulted.
Although the first amendment establishment clause challenge was
addressed, the Court decided Hardison on other grounds; but it ap-
pears to be beyond dispute that the Act's requiring employers to grant
privileges to religious observers as part of the accommodation pro-
cess 11 is not violative of the first amendment.
ANALYSIS
The Court in Hardison stated that provided there is no violation of
an agreed-upon seniority provision or collective bargaining agree-
ment, employers, and presumably labor organizations, still must
make reasonable accommodations, short of incurring an undue hard-
ship, to the religious observances of their employees or members.
However, all of the discussion by the Court focused on one pertinent
issue, to what extent must an employer accommodate.
The Court limited "reasonable accommodation" to a de minimus
cost. The rationale for the Court's selection of such a limitation is not
stated. A de minimus standard conflicts with the previous require-
"1413 U.S. 756 (1973), See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
See Handier, Title VII And The Sabbath Observer, 5 HoFsTRA L. REv. 911, 921, 922
(1977).
"Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 1975), ff'd mem. by an
equally divided Court 97 S.Ct. 342 (1976). See Handler, Title VII And The Sabbath
Observer, 5 HOFSrRA L. REV. 911, 921 (1977).
"Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 1975); Handler, Title VII
And The Sabbath Observer, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 911, 922 (1977).
"This statement is assumed because the Supreme Court in Hardison avoided the
first amendment issue or failed to state otherwise.
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ment of proving undue hardship. Did not Congress intend for an
employer to show a "substantial" loss before there would be an undue
hardship? Has not the burden of employers to show they could not
accommodate without undue hardship been shifted partially to the
employee as a result of this limitation? Does this new rule now make
it possible for employers and unions to discriminate intentionally
against the religious practices of individuals and to disguise their in-
tentions by proving any accommodation would be more than a de
minimus cost and thus an undue hardship?
The Court said to allow Hardison to trade shifts with another
employee would be a violation of the seniority provisions of the
collective-bargaining agreement and thus an undue hardship. Would
the Court have ruled differently if the seniority provisions had been
part of a company policy but not part of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment? The answer may be implied from the Court's opinion. A labor
organization's duty to accommodate religious observances is less than
the duty imposed on an employer. As a result of this unequal stan-
dard, unfavorable repercussions are possible for Sabbatarians.1'
The effects of the Hardison decision can be seen in several recent
court decisions." But in more elementary terms, the following are
several assumptions that can be made concerning the impact of this
decision on Saturday worshippers:
(1) Sabbatarians will have less inclination to take union affiliated
jobs and therefore will seek less paying employment.
(2) Some Sabbatarians will have to choose between their religious
preferences and their employment preferences.
(3) Many will be forced to sacrifice years of training and expertise
and seek other employment; and
(4) Finally, there will be an overall effect of some underemploy-
ment and economic waste.
CONCLUSION
Hardison has completed what seems to be a circle of religious
discrimination cases. Beginning with Dewey, prior to the 1972
"Sabbatarians are those who worship on the seventh day of the week (Saturday).
Orthodox Jews, Seventh-Day Adventists, Seventh-Day Baptists and the World Wide
Church of God are religious denominations that require their members to worship on
Saturday. It is important to note that the "accommodation rule" applies to all
weekend worshippers, Friday through Sunday.
"See Jordan v. North Carolina, 46 U.S.L.W. 2225 (1977); Chrysler Corp. v. Mann,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 788 (1977); Huston v. Auto Workers, Local 93, 15 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 326 (1977); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 471 (1977). These decisions cited Hardison as controlling and applied its rationale
in regard to seniority provisions as well as the de minimus cost to employers in accom-
modating employees.
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amendment, the employer's duty to accommodate the religious prac-
tices of an employee was narrowly construed. Then in Cummins,
after the 1972 amendment, the duty was extended by requiring an
employer to make substantial efforts to accommodate the religious
observances of employees. Finally, in Hardison the Court has once
again held the employer's duty to accommodate to a minimum.
While subsequent attempts to circumvent the Hardison decision
have been unsuccessful,' whether it represents a final solution to
religious discrimination is yet to be determined.
Hunter W. Lundy
"See H.R. 8429, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8670, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) and H.R. 9809, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Congressmen have introduced
these bills to amend § 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The acts redefine the word
"religion" and the accommodation rule and thus provide increased protection to
employees' religious observances and practices.
